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THE DESIGN OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A REPLY TO
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In The Expectations of Consumers,I I examine a much-maligned prod-
ucts liability doctrine that attempts to rest manufacturer liability for de-
fective product designs on the expectations of ordinary consumers. Al-
though I concur with previous commentators who regard the consumer
expectations doctrine to date as both undertheorized and unwieldy in
application, I also observe the stubborn refusal of a significant minority of
jurisdictions to abandon it. Notably, several of these jurisdictions have
clung to the doctrine even after the decisive conclusion of the ALI's Re-
statement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability that consumer expectations are
unworthy of recognition as an independent test for design defect.
After first describing these treacherous waters, I then enter them by
offering a reinvigorated understanding of the consumer expectations
doctrine that seeks to capture important aspects of public health and
safety concerns that the Restatement formulation excludes and that courts
plausibly might be groping toward in their consumer expectations juris-
prudence. Rather than permit unguided conjecture by jury members re-
garding the content of consumer expectations, however, I recommend
that the doctrine be redirected specifically toward those aspects of risk
perception and evaluation that express important public values regarding
the acceptability of product-caused harms, but that cannot be subsumed
within a technically-oriented reasonable alternative design standard. Al-
though I attempt to provide both a theoretical foundation for and a prac-
tical explication of the consumer expectations doctrine as reconceived in
this light, I also note in the Article that the test "should be thought of as a
work in progress, subject to debate and revision in the best spirit of the
common law.' '2 Consistent with that ambition, therefore, I am extremely
grateful that Professors Henderson and Twerski, who served as Reporters
for the Third Restatement, have offered their careful, constructive response
to my proposal.
3
Space permits me to address here only two of their critiques. The
Reporters contend that the reinvigorated consumer expectations test de-
scribed in The Expectations of Consumers reflects "elitism," first because it
permits courts to make judgments that they believe should be made only
by the "more populist-oriented branches of government"4 and, second,
because it substitutes the "soft technology" of psychology for the free-
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ranging opinions of actual jury members to define consumer expecta-
tions. 5 With regard to the first contention, my response simply is that
courts and legislatures are complementary, rather than exclusive, institu-
tions, and more importantly that courts are the one forum in our system
where the concerns of ordinary citizens must be heard and answered.
Frequently, the "elitist" interventions of judges and juries better can be
viewed as an indication that the supposedly more populist-oriented
branches of government have failed to address a problem of serious so-
cial concern. Tort liability in that sense does not represent a moment of
antidemocratic overreaching, but rather a starting point for the working
out of what plagues us.
With regard to the second contention, the Reporters are correct to
observe that my test would tie consumer expectations specifically to the
findings of cognitive psychologists and other expert observers of human
behavior and perception. However, to the extent that my proposal en-
courages the substitution of concrete psychological findings for juror
speculation in this manner, it does so out of the same concerns of formal-
ism and administrability that drove Professors Henderson and Twerski to
endorse the reasonable alternative design requirement in the Third Re-
statement. The only difference between our views seems to be that, while
the Reporters would push those concerns to the point of issuing summary
judgment against a female plaintiff who raises "tangential" interests such
as the distribution of deaths by gender in the air bag example, my test
would allow her into the courtroom to argue before a jury of her peers.
Importantly, it would do so out of a recognition that the tort system's
integrity is threatened not only by giving insufficient attention to con-
cerns of formality, but also by failing to reflect the acknowledged values
and beliefs of its audience.
To be sure, my approach conceives of lay risk values of this nature as
supplements to, rather than substitutes for, risk-utility analysis, given the
frailty and fallibility of human safety expectations. The Reporters com-
plain that this "double whammy" aspect of my approach only permits the
use of consumer expectations as a sword for injured plaintiffs, rather than
a shield for defendants. As they admit, however, the Third Restatement
offers only the converse in its treatment of "tangential policy grounds"
such as "gender neutrality."'6 That is, in the specific context exemplified
by the air bag example, the Restatement weighs consumer expectations in
favor of defendants, but not plaintiffs: All shield, no sword.
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